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ANTI-TRUST STATUTE-CONSTRUCTION.-STATE V. M. K. & T. R. P Co., 91
SOUTHWESTERN 214 (TEx.).-Held, that the anti-trust statutes of Texas,
requiring every railroad to furinish reasonable and equal facilities for all cor-
porations engaged in the express business, and defining a trust as a combina-
tion of capital, skill, or acts of two or more persons to create or carry out
restrictions in the free pursuit of any business, should be construed as pro-
hibiting a contract between a railroad company and an express company
whereby the latter was given exclusive privileges, and the former bound itself
not to contract with others to do an express contract on the road, and
agreed that in case privileges should be accorded others by legislation or judi-
cial proceedings the express company in question should have credit for the
sums paid by other companies.
BANKS AND BANKING-SAVINGS BANKS-AssIGNMENT OF DEPOSIT.-
AUGS1IURY V. SHURTLIFF, 99 N. Y. SuPP. 989.-Held, that a depositor in a sav-
ings bank may assign or transfer his interest in his deposit for a valuable con-
sideration, without the delivery of the pass-book representing the deposit.
The relation between bank and depositor is simply that of debtor and
creditor. Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252, 256, and the bank holds
the fund subject to be paid out to the creditor according to the terms imposed
by him. Shipmnan v. Bank, 126 N. Y. 318. Intention to "assign need not be in
express terms, but may be implied from any act or instrument which admits
of such interpretation. Garnsey v. Gardner, 49 U. S. 167. The rule that a
cause of action may be assigned by parol extends to a debt due to assignor
from third person, as a deposit in a bank, Phwnix Bank v. Risley, III U. S.
125. A pass-book in itself constitutes no evidence of a right to draw money
thereon. It merely imports a liability to depositor for moneys received.
Smith v. Brooklyn Bank, I N. Y. 58. An order for whole sum due and
given in good faith for a valid consideration, constitutes an assignment of
deposit in hands of savings bank. Kingman v. Perkins, io5 Mass. III.
Although the precise point involved does not seem to have arisen, the
principles involved are clear and seem to uphold the case.
CARRIERS-TREATMENT OF PASSENGERS-MENTAL SUFFERING SUBJECT FOR
DAMAGES.-GULF, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. CooPwooD, 96 S. W. 1o2 (TEx.).-
Held, that the trial judge did not err in charging that the physical and men-
tal suffering resulting to the plaintiff from the negligent treatment of her
daughter by the employees of the defendant constituted actual damages.
COMMON CARRIER-CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY.-TEWES V. NORTH
GERMAN LLOYD STEAMSHIP COMPANY, 78 N. E. 864 (N. Y.).-Held,
that a ticket for an ocean voyage is a contract, and that the fact that the con-
ditions on the ticket were not brought especially to the notice of the passen-
ger would not relieve him from the enforcement of those conditions by the
company. SEE COMMENT.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoNsPiRAcy.-HoDES V. UNITED STATES, 203 U. S.
i.-Held, that the Federal courts have no jurisdiction under Thirteenth
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Amendment as sections 1978, 1979, 5508, 5510, Revised Statutes, 
of a charge of
conspiracy made and carried out in a state to prevent 
citizens of African
descent. because of their race and color, from making 
or carrying out con-
tracts and agreements to labor. SEE COMMENT.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DIScRIMINATION-PUBLIC 
CONVEYANCEs.-MORRI-
SON V. STATE, 95 S. W. (TENN.) 4 9 4 .- Held, that a state 
statute which
requires the separation of white and colored persons 
on street cars is a
proper police regulation and not violative of constitutional 
provisions as
abridging the privileges of citizens, or depriving them of equal 
protection of
the law.
Equal accommodations are not denied when separate, 
but equally good
cars are furnished for white and black persons, Britton v. 
Atlantic R. R., 88
N. C. 536; for equality of accommodations, as required 
by the prohibition
against discrimination, is not common and joint enjoyment of such accom-
modations, Anderson v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 62 Fed. 
46. By its police
power a state may not regulate interstate commerce, Leisy 
v. Hardin, 135 N.
S. ioo; but it has been resorted to to remove such restrictions 
of carriers
upon interstate traffic, Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485. By its 
police power a
state may determine the reasonableness of such regulations with 
reference to
its established customs and traditions, and for the preservation 
of public peace
and good order. Plessy v. Fergurson, 163 U. S. 537. Separate 
cars may be
required just as ladies' cars and smoking cars, as conducive to the comfort of
parties separately accommodated. Freund on Police Power, 
Section 699;
which latter regulation may be imposed as restricting a nuisance. 
Booth on
Street Railways, Section 238. State of Louisiana v. Heidenbain, 42 La. An.
483.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LABOR LEGISLATION-VALIDITY---EoPLE 
V. MAR-
CUS, 77 N. E. 1073 (N. Y.). A provision of the New York Penal Code,
making it a misdemeanor for an employer to coerce or compel 
employees to
enter into an agreement not to join a labor organization as a condition to
securing or retaining employment held unconstitutional. SEE COMMENT.
CONTACTs-PARTIEs-RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES.VAN 
METER V. PooLE,
95 S. W. (Mo.) 96o.-Held, that a contract between two persons 
may be
enforced by a third when entered into for his benefit
Such a holding is an important exception to the rule,-recognized 
by all
courts in its general application,-that a contract cannot 
confer rights on a
person who is not a party to it. This exception is denied 
by the courts of
England, Massachusetts, and some other states, either in law 
or equity, unless
there is some declaration of trust Murray v. Flavell, 
25 Ch. Div. 89;
Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37. But is upheld in New 
York and most
of the other states. Lawrence v. Fox, 2o N. Y. 268. Generally, 
all jurisdic-
tions have repudiated the "blood relation" doctrine, fostered 
by Lord Mans-
field. Wilbur v. Wilbur, 17 R. I. 295; Marston v. Bigelow, i5o Mass. 
53.
Even in those states where the third party beneficiary is allowed 
to sue, there
must be something more than a mere promise for the benefit 
of the third
person. The promise must be for his benefit, Siinson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355.
And, in addition, there must be between the promisee and 
the third person
seeking to enforce the promise, the relation of debtor and 
creditor, or some
such relation as makes the performance of the promise 
a satisfaction of
some legal or ecquitable dut: owing by the promisee to such 
third person.
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Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498. By statute, in many of the states,-no
doubt in all of the code states,-it is expressly provided that, except in cer-
tain cases, every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest; under such a provision, it has been held that the person for whose
benefit a contract is made may sue thereon. Bliss Code Pl. 241; Pomeroy,
Rem. & Rem. R., i39; Peducah Lumber Co. v. Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340.
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-WHEN SATISFIED. ROBERTS V. TEx-
PLETON, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 790, (OREGON). Where one in possession of a
mining claim under a prospecting contract with one part owner purchased
the share of the other owner, and merely continued his possession and opera-
tions without anything to connect him with the later contract, held, that this
was not a sufficient taking of possession to satisfy the statute of frauds.
CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS-PARTIES TO AcTIoN.-McCREA v. McCLEN-
AHAN ET AL, 99 N. Y. S. 689. The defendant, McClenahan, president of the
corporation, received certain corporate funds for which he failed to account
and which he appropriated to purposes for his sole benefit This action was
brought under Code Civ. Proc., Section 447, providing that any person having
an adverse interest, or who may be a necessary party defendant to a complete
settlement of the controversy, may be joined as defendant. Held, that one
stockholder cannot join other stockholders as parties defendants with the
defaulting president, even in case they refuse to join as parties plaintiff.
O'Brien, P. J., and Clarke, J., dissenting.
A single stockholder cannot, without suing in behalf of all interested
stockholders, maintain an action for misfeasance of officers. McAfee v.
Zettler, io3 Ga. 579. The plaintiff must bring the suit on behalf of such
stockholders as care to join him, Cook's Stock and Stockholders and Corpo-
ration Law, Section 737; but those refusing to join him must be made defend-
ants. Davis v. Peabody, 17o Mass. 397. The purpose of the code provision
being to avoid a multiplicity of suits by a complete determination of rights,
Turner v. Conant, 18 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) i6o, it has been so interpreted that
any person may be made a defendant who is a party necessary to a final set-
tlement of the question involved. Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 532. Nird-
linger v. Bernheimer, 133 N. Y. 45, 54.
CORPORATIONS-SuITS BY STOCKHOLDERS-WHEN DEMAND FOR CORPORATE
ACTION IS UNNECESSARY.-POLHEMUS V. POLHEMUS, l00 N. Y. SUPP.
263.-Held, that a stockholder may bring a suit in his own name for miscon-
duct of the directors, without first requesting the corporation to bring the
action, where such guilty directors are in control of the corporation.
The general rule is that stockholders cannot sue to redress injuries to the
corporation caused by the misconduct of strangers or directors. Hawes v.
Oakland, 104 U. S. 450; Alden v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456; Button v. Hoff-
man, 61 Wis. 2o. A stockholder may sue in equity, however, if the directors
of the corporation are guilty of fraud in the management of the affairs of the
corporation, and the stockholders cannot obtain redress through the corpora-
tion. Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen 52. But this right of the stockholders to sue
depends, as a general rule, on their inability to obtain redress through the
corporation and it must appear in the bill that the stockholders attempted
to obtain redress by requesting the officers of the corporation to take action.
Failure to show this request and refusal, makes the bill demurrable. Mem-
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phis & Charleston R. Co. v. Woods, 88 Ala. 630. However, where the wrong
was done by the directors in control of the corporation, such a demand and
refusal need not be shown in the bill nor proved. Brewer v. Boston Theater,
1o4 Mass. 378; Rogers v. R. R. Co., 9I Fed. 299.
CRIMINAL LAw-ATTEMPT TO CoMMr SuIciDE-INDIcTABLE OFFENSE.-
MAY v. PENNELL, 64 ATL. 885 (ME.).-Held, that in the absence of an express
statute, an attempt to commit suicide is not an indictable offense.
This case comes nearer than any decision yet reported in this country
directly deciding, on common law grounds, the interesting point involved.
Aside from cases construing statutes, Commonwealth v. Dennis, io5 Mass.
162, is the only other American case which has dealt with an attempt to com-
mit suicide. That decision, in holding such an attempt not a punishable
offense, based its reasoning on the fact that in Massachusetts the whole sub-
ject of attempt had been regulated by statute and the common law impliedly
repealed. While to some extent analogous to that case, the present decision
goes further and virtually holds that, in the absence of a statute, an attempt
to commit suicide is not punishable. This view is in conflict with what seems
to be the English rule, for, while there have been no authoritative holdings,
the two cases in which the question arose clearly enunciate the doctrine that
a suicidal attempt is a misdemeanor. Reg. v. Burgess, 9 Cox C. C. 247; Reg.
v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463. So, also, the leading text writers have approved
and adopted this view. Clark's Criminal Law, 196. A priori, it would seem,
that, if suicide can be considered a crime, an attempt to commit that crime is
punishable. At common law suicide was a crime. 4 Blackstone igo. And,
although Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio State 146, is authority to the contrary,
recent decisions reiterate this view. Commonwealth v. Hicks, ii8 Ky. 637;
State v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120.
CRIMINAL LAw-MANSLAUGHTER-NEGLiGENCE.STATE v. MOORE, i05
NORTHW STERN i6 (IA.).-Held, that a conviction for manslaughter should
be sustained on facts showing a reckless and negligent indifference to the
safety of others, and it is also held that it was unnecessary for the state in
order to support a conviction to prove that the deceased person was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
CRIMINAL LAw-RIGHT OF MuRDERER TO INHERIT FROM VIcTIM.-
McALLISTER v. FAIR, 84 PAcrFIc 112 (KANsAS).-Held, that under a statute
of Kansas, providing in clear terms that a husband shall inherit from his
deceased wife, and making no exception to the rule, the court is not justified
in reading into the statute a clause disinheriting a husband because he felo-
niously killed his intestate wife for the purpose of acquiring her property.
DIvoRcE-CoNVIcTION OF CRIME-EFFECT OF PARDON.-HALLOWAY v. HAL-
LOWAY, 55 S. E. 19, (KY.).-A statute provides that the conviction of a mar-
ried person of an offense involving moral turpitude, followed by a sentence in
the penitentiary for a term of two years or longer, gives to the other party
to the marriage a right to a divorce. The defendant was convicted of such
an offense, and, after serving five years in the penitentiary, was pardoned.
After the pardon the other party to the marriage brought her bill for divorce.
Held, that her right to a divorce was not affected by the pardon.
This case is a direct ruling on a hitherto undecided point. The weight
of authority upholds the general rule that an absolute pardon relieves the
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person to whom it is granted from all consequential disabilities of judgment
and restores him to his prior rights. Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Or. 568; State v.
Foley, 15 Nev. 64. The only exception to this is that a full pardon cannot
restore to the recipient any rights or interests which have become vested in
others in consequence of the judgment. Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. 333.
From this some text writers have reasoned to the conclusion set forth by this
case. Schouler's Husband and Wife, 554.
EASEMENTS-PARTY WALLS.-JAcKsON V. BRUNS, io6 NORTHWESTERN I.-
Held, that the owner of the second story of a building has no equitable right
to compel the owner of the first story to keep the foundation and walls of the
first story in repair for the purpose of furnishing continuing support to the
second story in the absence of any express or implied contract on- the part of
the owner of the first story to do so.
EVIDENCE-OPINION EVIDENCE-QUALIFICATION OF WrrNESS.-MANHAT-
TAN DF-ivERY Co. v. SIMON, 98 N. Y. Supp. 844.-Held, it was error to per-
mit a witness to testify as to the value of certain work done on garments,
without having previously qualified himself as competent to so testify.
Although opinions of witnesses are to be excluded except upon ques-
tions of science and skill, as to which they have been specially educated, yet
a witness may give estimates and opinions on questions of value. Willis v.
McCarn, 33 Barber, 115. The general rule is to the contrary, however, and a
witness must first qualify before he can testify as to opinion of value of cer-
tain articles. Gregory v. Fichter, 14 N. Y. Supp. 89I. Where an article has
no market value, its value may be shown by opinions of witnesses properly
informed as to things of a similar nature. Sullivan v. Lear, 23 Fla. 463.
Opinions respecting value of property are incompetent when witnesses fail to
show a sufficient general knowledge of the subject-matter, Haight v. Kimbark,
51 Ia. 13. But the objection cannot be urged where an opportunity for cross-
examination has been given. Klotz v. fames, 96 Ia. i.
EVIDENCE-REGULATIONS OF DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT-JUDICAL
NoTIcE.-STATE v. SOUTHERN Ry. Co., 54 S. E. 295 (N. C.).-Held, the
courts will take judicial notice of the rules and regulations adopted by the
United States Department of Agriculture, concerning cattle transportation,
and applicable within the state.
Courts should take judicial notice of what ought to be generally known
within the limits of their jurisdiction. Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 238. In
the early cases there was a tendency to refuse to take judicial notice of the
regulations of the executive departments. So in 1857, the courts of California
refused to take judicial notice of the rules of department of the Interior.
Hensley v. Tarkey, 7 Cal. 288. Similarly in regard to regulations of Treas-
ury Department Moore v. Worthington, 63 Ky. 3o7. Now it is generally
recognized that the rules and regulations of one of the departments of gov-
ernment, established in accordance with statute, have the force of law, Gratiot
v. U. 5., 4 How. 8o; and courts take judicial notice of them. Long v.
Hanson, 72 Me. io4. Hence, the courts of Montana will take judicial notice
of the rules and regulations of the Department of the Interior. U. S. v. Wil-
liams, 6 Mont. 379. Federal courts take judicial notice of administrative reg-
ulations of considerable notoriety, including the rules of Federal executive
departments. Dominici v. U. S., 72 Fed. 46.
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INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-WARRANTIEs.-NATIoNAL 
LIFE INs. Co. oF
U. S. A. v. REPPOND, 96 S. W. 778 (TEx.).-Held, that, where the statements
in the application for a life policy are made warranties, it is essential to the
validity of the policy that the statements be true without reference to the
question of their materiality.
Warranties are in the nature of conditions precedent, so that the rights
of the insured depend on his strict compliance with the warranties. Fowler
v. Ins. Co., 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 673; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford,
98 Va. 195. In the present case, the statements in the application were made
warranties. Stipulations of this character are necessary to protect the insurer.
Vance on Insurance, Section io4. Courts will presume conclusively that
statements are material when they are made warranties by the parties, as in
this case, and a breach of a warranty will be a good defense in an action on
the policy. Hutchinson v. Ins. Co. 39 S. W. (Texas) 325; Stensgaard v. St.
Paul Real Estate Title Ins. Co., 50 Minn. 429; Jeffries v. Ins. Co., 22 Wall.
(U. S.) 47.
MANDAmUS-RIGHT To APPEAL-HANSON V. POLICE JURY OF ST. MARY'S
PARISH, 41 So. (LA.) 32.-Held, that mandamus generally will not lie 
if
there is a right of appeal.
The functions of this prerogative writ are the enforcement of duties to
the public by officers, and others who neglect or refute to perform them and
for which there is no other specific legal remedy, Legg v. City of Annapolis,
42 Md. 2o3, and mandamus cannot be used to perform the office of an appeal
or a writ of error, Ex parte Schwab, 98 U. S. 24o. This general rule is too
far-sweeping and invites the criticism of a rigidity approaching harshness, for
this writ will be granted when the remedy by action is doubtful. - Clark v.
Miller, 47 Barber, 38; or even if there is an equitable remedy existing.
Commonwealth v. Allegheny County Com'rs, 32 Pa. 218. The same excep-
tion is taken when a writ of error is inadequate by reason of expense and
delay involved, North Alabama Development Co. v. Orman, 71 Fed. 764; or
when there is a remedy by appeal, if the action is clearly inadequate, City
of Huron v. Campbell, 3 S. D. 3o9; or when an appeal is proper, but there is
no one to prosecute it, as, after a claim has been filed by an administrator
against the estate of another decedent, if such administrator die and a motion
to revive the action in the name of his successor is denied, the only remedy is
by mandamus, Reynolds v. Crook, 95 Ala. 570.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SAFE PLACE TO WoRK.-WALxER v. GLEASON, 96
N. Y. Suprp. 843 (N. Y.).-Landlord contracted with a tenant to keep the
hall lamps in the building in order, and subsequently, while the tenant
was working with the lamps in one of her own rooms, the ceiling fell and
injured her. Thereupon the landlord was sued for the personal injuries, the
tenant contending that the relation of master and servant existed.-Held,
that under these circumstances the landlord was not liable on the ground
that, as an employer, he had failed to furnish a safe place to work.
.. NUISANCE-RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMfAGES.-MILLER v. EDISON ELEcrIc
ILLul. CO., 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) io6o (N. Y.).-Held, that a lessor cannot
recover damages for injury to the enjoyment and occupation of premises
while they are in possession of a tenant, by the maintenance of a nuisance
not of a permanent character on adjoining premises, although during such
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continuance the lease had terminated and been renewed at a reduced rental
because of the nuisance.
PARTNERSHIP-TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-RIGHTS OF RETIRING
PARTNER.-WHITE v. TROWBRIDGE, 64 ATL. 862 (PA.).-A retiring partner
disposed of all his rights and property in the firm, but entered into no con-
tract restricting him from prosecuting a similar competing business. Held,
that he is not deprived of the right to use his own name in connection with
such competing business, from the fact that his surname is a portion of the
trade-mark used by the firm of which he was formerly a member.
A person has the right to the honest use of his own name, even to the
infringement of a trade-mark. Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 293; Schier v.
Johnson, III Mass. 238. However, an assignment by a retiring partner of all
his stock, property and effects carries the right to use his personal name when
it has become a trade name. Hoxie v. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592. And it fol-
lows that the firm is entitled to protection in the use of such name. Myers v.
Buggy Co., 54 Mich. 215. In some cases this doctrine has been extended and
Le Page v. Russia Cement Co., 5I Fed. 941, holds that, when an individual's
name has become a trade name belonging to another person, the right to use
his name in connection with an article, even to state that it is manufactured
by him, must be denied to a person who has previously disposed of his inter-
est in the business. The better rule, however, would seem to be that, when
a person has in any way acquired a right to a trade name, another person is
only precluded from using his own name in such a way as to confuse his busi-
ness with that of the original firm. Walter Baker & Co. v. Baker, 87 Fed.
2og; Gage v. Pub. Co., io Ont. App. 4o2.
RAILROADS-NEGLIGENT OPERATIoN-NUISANCE.-COLGATE v. N. Y. CENT.
Ry. Co., ioo N. Y. SunP. 65o.-Held, where a railroad company so negligently
operated its road as to permit unnecessary whistling and bell ringing in the
residential section of a town, such acts constituted a private nuisance to an
abutting land owner.
An action will not lie for mere consequential injuries caused by the proper
and careful operation of a railroad. Beseman v. Penn. Ry. Co., 50 N. J. Law
235; Struthers v. Dunkirk W. & P. Ry. Co., 87 Pa. 282. But whistling and
bell ringing as allowed by the legislature, are not signals for the convenience
of its employees, and if used as such and thereby the public is unnecessarily
disturbed, they constitute a legal nuisance. Presbrey v. Railway Co., io3
Mass. I; Williams v. N. Y. Cent. Ry. Co., 16 N. Y. 97. What may be unob-
jectionable in a legal sense, in one locality may be a legal nuisance in another.
First Baptist Church v. Utica & S. R. Co., 6 Barb. 373; Rodenbranscn v.
Craven, 141 Pa. 546. The weight of authority in the United States is that, to
constitute a nuisance, the acts must be such as to materially interfere with
the comfort of an ordinary, reasonable person in the vicinity, Sparhawk v.
Railway Co., 54 Pa. 401; Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478; and not
merely to incommode a sick person. Rogers v. Elliott, 146 M-s. 349; FOy V.
Whitman, ioo Mass. 76. And it is no defense that all the other persons in
that locality are injured in the same way. Wesson v. l'ashburn IronJ, Co., 13
Allen, 95.
RELIGIOUS SocIETIEs-TrrLE TO PROPERTY-MATERIALITI.-LEE V. METHO-
DIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN V. S., 78 N. E. 646 (MAs.).-A grantor con-
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veyed land to grantees by a deed in consideration of money paid by them as
trustees of an unincorporated church the words being "trustees, their heirs
and assigns." Held, in a suit by new trustees against persons acting as new
trustees, involving the right to the property that the intention of the grantor
to vest the property in the grantees as trustees was immaterial; for, if the
deed was to the grantees as trustees, the title to the property did not vest in
others by force of their appointment as trustees.
The general rule is that a trustee cannot delegate his authority. Bispham
on Eq., p. 219. The election of new trustees by an incorporated society
in conformity with the usages of their church, created no privity of estate
between them and the trustees who took the land by the deed, and could have
no effect in law to divest of the title, those grantees named in the deed or the
survivor of them. Peabody v. Eastern Methodist Society in Lynn, 87 Mass.
540. But a conveyance to trustees for the use of a religious society without
naming any of them vests the title in the corporation named in the deed.
Keith & P. Coal Co. v. Bingham, 97 Mo. 196. It is even held that a convey-
ance to trustees for the use of a religious society, whether trustees are or are
not named, executes a legal estate in the congregation itself not by way of
charitable use, but in absolute ownership. Brendle v. German Ref. Cong. of
Jackson Township, 33 Pa. 415.
RESULTING TRUST-PAYMENT .OF PURCHASE MONEY-STATUThS.-FAGAN
v. McDONNELL, ioo N. Y. Supp. 641. Where a purchaser paid the considera-
tion for a conveyance and took title in the name of his niece, without her
knowledge, and she subsequently, having learned of it, executed a deed, blank
as to grantees, and gave it to the purchaser. Held, that although he and his
devisees held the property for eighteen years and the niece never claimed the
rents nor looked after it in any way, an action in ejectment would lie. Jenks,
J., dissenting.
In the absence of statute it is a general rule in England and in the United
States that where a purchaser pays the purchase money, but takes the title
in the name of another, a trust will result, by presumption of law, in his
favor. Perry on Trusts, Section 126; Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox. 92. A few
states, however, including New York, declare by statute that no such trust
will result unless the grantee takes as an absolute conveyance in his own
name, and without the consent of the purchaser. Real Prop. Laws of N. Y.
(1896) Section 74. Such statutes are analogous to the common law rule, that
where there is a feoffment to another without a consideration, if the use was
actually declared it would prevail. T Sander's Uses and Trusts, 59;
Sugden's Gilbert Uses, 89. These statutes, however, make an exception when
there is a fraud, and a trust may be insisted upon. Kennedy v. McCloskey,
i7o Pa. 354. Rouchefoucaula v. Boustead, i Ch. 2o6. Hence, in this case, a
defrauded creditor would be allowed to enforce a resulting trust, so far as
may be necessary for the satisfaction of his claim. McCartney v. Bostwick,
32 N. Y. 53; I Stimson's Ant. St. Law, Section i7o6. Or if the grantor did
not consent to it, Haack v. Weicker, i18 N. Y. 67; Lloyd v. Woods, 176 Pa.
63. However, a resulting trust will not arise against the positive provision
of a statute, nor in contravention of public policy. Bispham on Equity, (7th
ed.) Section 82; Hill on Trustees, p. 93, 94. And parol evidence is admissi-
ble both to create and rebut such resulting trusts. Swinburne v. Swinburne,
28 N. Y. 568; Blodgett v. Hildreth, xo3 Mass. 487.
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TAXAIoN-TRANSFm TAx-CRPORATE STocm-IN RE CooLxy's ESTATE,
78 N. E. (N. Y.) 939. A Massachusetts and a New York corporation com-
bined and incorporated under the laws of both states with a single issue of
stock, one-sixth of the property being in New York. Held, that the tax
imposed by the New York statute upon the transfer by will of such stock as
personal property of a non-resident decedent is to be assessed upon the basis
of the location of the property. Werner & Chase, JJ., dissenting.
The transfer tax is not a property tax, In re Wolfe's Estate, Section 9
App. Div. (N. Y.) 349; it is an excise or duty on the privilege of succes-
sion, Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, page 7o8; State of Missouri ex
rel. Garth v. Switzler, 4o L. R. 9 (Mo.) 280. As such privilege, it is the cre-
ation of the civil or municipal law, Strode v. Com., 52 Pa. i8I; and, as
applied in the main cse, is denied at common law, Union Bank v. State, 9
Yerg. (Tenn.) 49o. The incorporating state may then give shares of stock a
special situs for taxation purposes. Cooley on Taxation (2nd ed.), p. 23;
Tappan v. Merchant's Nat. Bank, i9 Wall. (U. S.) 49o; though by the general
rule personalty follows the domicile of the owner. Thompson v. Advocate
Gen. 12 Clark & F. I; Story on Conyict of Laws, Section 481, et seq.; In re
Romaine's Estate, 127 N. Y. 80. As in the main case, the amount of the tax
may be fixed by referring to the value of the property passing, Plummer v.
Coler, 178 U. S. 1i5; but a tax upon the entire amount could not be objected
to on constitutional grounds, Blackstone v. Miller, i88 U. S. i89. That such
a tax should be reasonable is enforced on the grounds of natural justice and
the spirit of the Constitution. Tyson v. State, 28 Md. 577; Minot v. Win-
throp, i62 Mass. 113. This seems to be the real reason for the equitable doc-
trine of the main case in avoiding double taxation. SEE COMMENT, supra.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIEs-DELAY IN TRANSMITTING MESSAGEs-DAMAGES.
LucAs v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY, iog N. W. 191 (IA.).-
Held, that if because of unreasonable delay in the acceptance, a contract
was not completed, then it was for the jury to say whether the defendant
was negligent in transmitting the message, and owing to this the plaintiff
lost the benefit of entering into the contract SEE COMMENT.
ToRs-ELEcrRICITY-DuTY OF ELEcTRIc LIGHT COMPANY, Ioo N. Y.
SUPP. 539.-Held, that an electric light company owed to a licensee or tres-
passer on its poles no duty to keep its wires properly insulated and one stand-
ing in either relation to it must be held to the exercise of reasonable care.
Care in the case of persons using a highly destructive agency means
more than mere mechanical skill; it includes circumspection and foresight
with regard to reasonably probable contingencies. Anderson v. Jersey City
Electric Light Co., 43 Atl. 654 (N. J.). However, those who employ in the
prosecution of their business a highly dangerous agency such as electricity
are bound to exercise such precaution to prevent injury to others as emer-
gency would reasonably seem to require. Atlanta Consol. Street R. Co. v.
Owings, 97 Ga. 663; Joyce on Electric Law, par. 664. In Newark Electric
Light & Power Co. v. Gorden, 39 U. S. App. 416, a distinction is made be-
tween a trespasser and a licensee, holding that an electric light company is not
bound to keep the insulation of his wires upon a pole in good condition as
against a mere trespasser who intrudes upon such pole, but in maintaining
wires upon same pole with other companies is bound to use due care in insu-
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lating such wires. One doctrine goes so far as to hold. that the only way to
prevent accident where deadly electricity is used is to have perfect protection
at those points where people are liable to come into contact with it, on the
ground that as electricity cannot be seen and is silent and deadly, those who
manufacture and use it for private advantage must do so at their own peril.
Overall v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 47 S. W. 442 (Ky.).
TORTs-RAILROADS-INJURIES To LICENSEE-HAYMAN V. PHILADELPHrA &
R. Ry. Co., 63 ATL. 967 (PA.).-Plaintiff, an employee of a locomotive works,
was engaged in loading an engine on defendant's cars. While walking on the
track back to the works, he was struck by the engine. Held, that this is within
act of 1868 (P. L. 58), Section i, providing that when any person shall sustain
personal injury or loss of life while lawfully engaged or employed about the
premises of a railroad company, of which he is not an employee, the right of
action shall be the same as if such person were an employee, but this section
shall not apply to passengers. The place of plaintiff's injury was in the
premises of the defendant and plaintiff must be considered a quasi employee
at the time of the accident Mestrezat, Potter and Elkin, JJ., dissenting.
Whether or not the object of the person injured was one in which the
owner of the premises was interested, is of decisive importance in determin-
ing whether the party was a licensee merely or was invited. Larmore v.
Crown Point Iron Co., ioi N. Y. 391. When persons engage in a business
directly connected with a railroad, they are discharging the duties of
employees and are to be regarded as such. Richter v. Penn. Co., io4 Pa. 513.
But a servant who leaves work assigned him in a place of safety and volun-
tarily places himself in a dangerous position, where he is hurt, has no right
of action against his employer. Knox v. Pioneer Coal Co., go Tenn. 546. A
servant may be in the service of two masters, who, as regards his service
and employment, will be regarded as partners. Swainson v. Northeastern R.
Co., 3 Exch. Div. 341. There are dicta implying the contrary to the effect
that persons upon railroad tracks, even by express invitation, may reasonably
be expected to avoid danger from trains. Schreiner v. Great Northern Rail-
way Co., 58 L. R. R. 77 (Minn.).
TRADE-mARxs-TRADE NA-MS-RIGHT TO IwyuNcrzox.-WARmE BROTHX-
ERs v. BARBER ASPHALT PAVING Co., io8 NORTHWESTERN 652 (MICH.).-
Held, that where a city calls for proposals for the construction of "Bitulithic"
pavement, and requires the pavement to be made according to certain speci-
fications, a company might be awarded the contract for the work, although
another company has habitually used the word "bitulithic" as a name for the
particular pavement made by them, and had had this trade name registered
and also filed for record as a trade name in the office of the secretary of the
state of Michigan. The court says that the injunction must be denied
because a trade name does not give one the exclusive right to make or sell a
given kind of goods, the trade name being simply to point out the origin or
ownership of the article to which it is affixed for the protection of the con-
sumer, and that in cases where the rights to the use of a trade name are
invaded the wrong consists in the sale of goods of one maunfacturer under
the false representation that they are the goods of another.
